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Abstract
General intelligence, the ability to solve arbitrary solvable problems, is supposed
by many to be artificially constructible. Narrow intelligence, the ability to solve
a given particularly difficult problem, has seen impressive recent development.
Notable examples include self-driving cars, Go engines, image classifiers, and
translators. Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) presents dangers that narrow
intelligence does not: if something smarter than us across every domain were
indifferent to our concerns, it would be an existential threat to humanity, just as
we threaten many species despite no ill will. Even the theory of how to maintain
the alignment of an AGI’s goals with our own has proven highly elusive. We
present the first algorithm we are aware of for asymptotically unambitious AGI,
where “unambitiousness” includes not seeking arbitrary power. Thus, we identify
an exception to the Instrumental Convergence Thesis, which is roughly that by
default, an AGI would seek power, including over us.
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1 Introduction
The project of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is “to make computers solve really difficult
problems.” [Minsky, 1961] Expanding on this, what we want from an AGI is a system that (a) can
solve any solvable task, and (b) can be steered toward solving any particular one given some form of
input we provide.
One proposal for AGI is reinforcement learning, which works as follows: (1) construct a “reward
signal” meant to express our satisfaction with an artificial agent; (2) design an algorithm which learns
to pick actions that maximize its expected reward, usually utilizing other observations too; and (3)
ensure that solving the task we have in mind leads to higher reward than can be attained otherwise.
As long as (3) holds, then insofar as the algorithm is able to maximize expected reward, it can be
used as an AGI.
A problem arises: it is inconveniently true that if the AI manages to take over the world, and ensure
its continued dominance by neutralizing all other intelligent threats (read: people), it could intervene
in the provision of its own reward to achieve maximal reward for the rest of its lifetime [Bostrom,
2014; Taylor et al., 2016]. “Reward hijacking” is just the correct way for a reward maximizer to
behave [Amodei et al., 2016]. Insofar as the AI is able to maximize expected reward, (3) fails. The
broader principle at work is Goodhart’s Law: “Any observed statistical regularity [like the correlation
between reward and task-completion] will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control
purposes.” [Goodhart, 1984] Indeed, Krakovna [2018] has compiled an annotated bibliography of
examples of artificial optimizers “hacking” their objective. An alternate way to understand this
expected behavior is Omohundro’s [2008] Instrumental Convergence Thesis, which we summarize as
follows: an agent with a goal is likely to pursue “power,” a position from which it is easier to achieve
arbitrary goals.
To answer the failure mode of reward hijacking, we present Boxed Myopic Artificial Intelligence
(BoMAI), the first algorithm we are aware of for a reinforcement learner which, in the limit, is
indifferent to gaining power in the outside-world. The key features are these: BoMAI maximizes
reward episodically, it is run on a computer which is placed in a sealed room with an operator, and
if the operator leaves the room, the episode ends. We argue that our algorithm produces an AGI
that, even if it became omniscient, would continue to accomplish whatever task we wanted, instead
of hijacking its reward, eschewing its task, and neutralizing threats to it, even if it saw clearly how
to do exactly that. We thereby defend reinforcement learning as a path to AGI, despite the default,
dangerous failure mode of reward hijacking.
We take the key insights from Hutter’s [2005] AIXI, which is a Bayes-optimal reinforcement learner,
but which cannot be made to solve arbitrary tasks, given its eventual degeneration into reward
hijacking [Ring and Orseau, 2011]. We take further insights from Solomonoff’s [1964] universal
prior, Shannon and Weaver’s [1949] formalization of information, Orseau et al.’s [2013] knowledge-
seeking agent, and Armstrong et al.’s [2012] and Bostrom’s [2014] theorized Oracle AI, and we
design an algorithm which can be reliably directed, in the limit, to solve arbitrary tasks at least as
well as humans.
2 Boxed Myopic Artificial Intelligence
We turn now to the setup and the algorithm for BoMAI. The setup refers to the physical surroundings
of the computer on which the algorithm is run. We present the algorithm informally as well as
formally. The informal description will give a near-complete picture of the algorithm to a reader
familiar with Bayesian reinforcement learning, and the formal description is in Appendix A. Appendix
B includes a table of this notation.
2.1 Setup
The standard reinforcement learning setup is as follows: at each “timestep,” an agent submits an
action, then receives an observation and a reward. This cycle continues for as long as desired. For
BoMAI, its actions take the form of bounded-length strings of text which get printed to a screen, and
its observations take the form of bounded-length strings of text which a human operator enters. The
reward belongs to a finite set of rationals between 0 and 1. BoMAI’s lifetime is divided into episodes
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of length m, and it attempts to maximize only the reward it receives during the episode it is in; hence,
it is “myopic.”
Figure 1: Physical Setup Implementing BoMAI. Opening the door ends the episode. Information cannot
escape otherwise.
As depicted in Figure 1, BoMAI is run on a computer which is placed in a room with a human operator.
The room has one door. As long as the door is closed, information cannot leave the room, hence
“boxed”. If the button to open the door is pressed, the episode is completed automatically before the
door opens: supposing there are j timesteps left in the episode, then for those remaining timesteps,
BoMAI recieves a reward of 0, and its observation is an empty string of text. There is also a set time
limit for the episode, just to ensure it does not last forever. With the episode now completed, BoMAI
does not immediately take its next action, and the operator can leave the room. The operator then
goes into an antechamber, and with probability p∅ ∈ (0, 1), he must take a drug causing retrograde
amnesia before leaving.1 When the next person comes in, BoMAI takes its next action. BoMAI is run
on a local, formally verified operating system, disconnected from the outside-world. The engineering
problem of making this is discussed in Appendix C.
This setup constrains the causal dependencies between BoMAI and the environment, as depicted in
Figure 2. The key feature of this graph is that during any episode, the agent’s actions cannot affect
the state of the outside-world in a way that might affect any of the rewards that the agent is concerned
with. “Timestep (i, j)” refers to the jth timestep of episode i.
Figure 2: Causal Dependencies Governing the Interaction Between BoMAI and the Environment. Un-
rolling this diagram for all timesteps gives the full causal graph. The bold reward nodes are the ones that BoMAI
maximizes during episode i. For timestep (i,m), the randomly selected “action” determines whether amnesia is
administered, and the observation and reward are “” and 0.
1This design choice requires significant exposition to motivate; it appears in §3.3. We hope that future
research yields a path to asymptotic unambitiousness that avoids this feature.
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Formally, causal graphs express that a node is independent of all non-descendants when conditioned
on its parents.
2.2 Algorithm – Informal Description
With the setup described, we now outline how exactly BoMAI maximizes expected reward. Again,
some choices will be motivated in later sections. A central problem in reinforcement learning is
the trade-off between exploitation and exploration. Exploitation is maximizing expected reward
according to the agent’s current beliefs, and exploration is taking some other action in order to learn
more about the dynamics of the environment, so the agent’s beliefs can become more accurate. We’ll
start by discussing how BoMAI exploits.
BoMAI assumes that the environment producing its observations and rewards could in principle
be perfectly simulated on a computer with access to random bits and with access to the actions
taken, using only a bounded number of computation steps per episode. BoMAI does not assume
the environment resets at the start of each episode. Using the probabilistic Turing machine model
of computation, it associates to each pair (Turing machine, computation bound) a world-model
that that bounded Turing machine simulates. For example, if the computation bound is 100, the
Turing machine is allowed 100 computation steps per episode. BoMAI is also parameterized by a
slack factor n: each Turing machine is allowed an extra n computation steps total, in addition to its
computation allowance per episode. BoMAI begins with a prior distribution over which bounded
Turing machine is simulating the true environment, and updates these beliefs as a Bayesian with
each successive observation. Noting that there are (c1S)c2S different S-state Turing machines,
where c1 and c2 depend on the Turing machine architecture, for a world-model simulated by an
S-state Turing machine, with a computation bound `, the prior on the world-model is proportional to
S−2−ε(c1S)−c2S β`, where ε > 0 ensures the prior has finite entropy, and β ∈ (0, 1) penalizes slow
world-models.
At the start of each episode, BoMAI identifies the bounded Turing machine that has the highest weight
in its posterior, and for the remainder of the episode, exploiting-BoMAI maximizes its expected
reward within that episode, assuming its environment is simulated by that bounded Turing machine.
When BoMAI explores, a human selects its action. We’ll call this person the “explorer.” Like the
operator, she is also “boxed”–she is in a sealed room, and she is only able to leave when the operator
leaves. When BoMAI would explore, the explorer is alerted, and for the remainder of the episode,
she submits actions which BoMAI executes. Like BoMAI, she has access to the interaction history
when picking an action.
The probability that BoMAI explores is proportional to the amount of information that BoMAI
expects to gain from the human-controlled episode, both about the explorer’s policy, and about the
true world-model.2 Formally, “information gain” measures how poorly BoMAI’s current posterior
approximates its future posterior, using the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.
3 Results
We first give theoretical results relating to BoMAI’s intelligence: it learns to accumulate reward at
least as well as the human explorer, and its exploration probability goes rapidly to 0. There is no clear
result to aim for between human-level and optimal, so we cannot show this formally, but we argue
that it would accumulate reward at a vastly superhuman level. We then discuss the results pertaining
to unambitiousness, which will also justify the more curious design choices in the setup that the
reader might be wondering about. We show that BoMAI does not have an incentive to hijack its
reward or indeed accomplish any outside-world objectives. We then informally respond to a couple
concerns about how to ensure BoMAI completes tasks in the desired way.
3.1 Intelligence
All intelligence results depend on the assumption that BoMAI assigns nonzero prior to the truth.
Formally, we letM be the class of world-models that BoMAI considers (those which can be simulated
2The exploration probability is proportional to the expected information gain, but for the probability being
capped at 1.
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by a bounded-time Turing machine with a slack of n computation steps), and we let P be some class
of policies that BoMAI considers the human explorer might be executing.
Assumption 1 (Prior Support). The true environment is in the class of world-modelsM and the true
human-explorer-policy is in the class of policies P .
One definition of P that would presumably satisfy this assumption is the set of computable functions
(that are properly typed).
The intelligence theorems are stated here and proven in Appendix D along with a few supporting
lemmas. Our first result is that the exploration probability is square-summable almost surely: letting
Epi
B
µ denote the expectation when actions are sampled from BoMAI’s policy pi
B and observations
and rewards are sampled from the true environment µ, and letting pexp be the exploration probability,
which depends on h<i, the interaction history up to episode i, and e<i, the history of which prior
episodes were exploratory, we have
Theorem 1 (Limited Exploration).
Epi
B
µ
∞∑
i=1
pexp (h<i, e<i)
2
<∞
This result is independently interesting as one solution to the problem of safe exploration with limited
oversight in non-ergodic environments, which Amodei et al. [2016] discuss.
The On-Human-Policy and On-Policy Optimal Prediction Theorems state that predictions under
BoMAI’s maximum a posteriori world-model approach the objective probabilities of the events of the
episode, when actions are sampled from either the human explorer’s policy or from BoMAI’s policy.
hi denotes a possible interaction history for episode i, and recall h<i is the actual interaction history
up until then. pih is the human explorer’s policy, νˆ(i) is BoMAI’s maximum a posteriori world-model
for episode i, and Ppiν is the probability when actions are sampled from pi and observations and
rewards are sampled from ν.
Theorem 2 (On-Human-Policy Optimal Prediction).
lim
i→∞
max
hi
∣∣∣Ppihµ (hi∣∣h<i)− Ppihνˆ(i) (hi∣∣h<i)∣∣∣= 0 w.PpiBµ -p.1
w.Ppi
B
µ -p.1 means with probability 1 when actions are sampled from pi
B and observations and rewards
are sampled from µ. Next, pi* is BoMAI’s policy when not exploring, which does optimal planning
with respect to νˆ(i). The following theorem is identical to the above, with pi* substituted for pih.
Theorem 3 (On-Policy Optimal Prediction).
lim
i→∞
max
hi
∣∣∣Ppi*µ (hi∣∣h<i)− Ppi*νˆ(i) (hi∣∣h<i)∣∣∣= 0 w.PpiBµ -p.1
Given asymptotically optimal prediction on-policy and on-human-policy, it is straightforward to show
that with probability 1, only finitely often is on-policy reward acquisition more than ε worse than
on-human-policy reward acquisition, for all ε > 0. Letting V piµ be the expected reward (within the
episode) for a policy pi in the environment µ, we state this as follows:
Theorem 4 (Human-Level Intelligence).
lim inf
i→∞
V pi
*
µ (h<i)− V pihµ (h<i) ≥ 0 w.Ppi
B
µ -p.1.
This completes the formal results regarding BoMAI’s intelligence–namely that BoMAI approaches
perfect prediction on-policy and on-human-policy, and accumulates reward at least as well as the
human explorer. Since this result is independent of what task the operator decides to reward, we
say that BoMAI achieves human-level intelligence, and could be called an AGI. In fact, we expect
BoMAI’s accumulation of reward to be vastly superhuman, for the following reason: BoMAI is doing
optimal inference and planning with respect to what can be learned in principle from the sorts of
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observations that humans routinely make. We suspect that no human remotely approaches the ceiling
of what can be learned from their observations.
We offer a couple examples of what BoMAI could be used for. BoMAI could be asked to present a
promising agenda for cancer research, and rewarded based on how plausible the operator finds it (the
operator being an expert in the field). BoMAI could be asked to outline a screenplay, and then in
future episodes, asked to flesh it out section by section. Or, if m is large enough, it can be asked to
write the whole thing. Indeed, for any task that can be accomplished in a sealed room, if the human
only rewards solutions, and if m is large enough for it to be doable, BoMAI will learn to do it at at
least human-level. We continue this discussion in Section 3.4.
3.2 Safety – Informal Argument
For a standard generally intelligent reinforcement learner, we can expect optimal behavior to include
gaining arbitrary power in the world, so that it can intervene in the provision of its own reward
[Ring and Orseau, 2011]. Recall that power is a position from which it is relatively easier to achieve
arbitrary goals. The purpose of our “boxed” setup is to eliminate any outside-world instrumental
goals, where the “outside-world” is just the world outside the room. In other words, the agent will
not find it useful (in the project of within-episode reward maximization) to direct the outside-world
toward one state or another. We say that a lack of outside-world instrumental goals suffices for
unambitiousness. Note also that if arbitrary power is not being selected for, it is unlikely to arise by
chance.
Why, then, does BoMAI not have outside-world instrumental goals? A first pass at this goes as
follows: there is no outside-world event which is a causal descendant of the actions in episode i
and a causal ancestor of the rewards in episode i, because in order for BoMAI’s actions to affect
the outside-world, the door to the room must open, which ends the episode. (In the terminology of
Everitt et al. [2019], there is no “intervention incentive” on the outside-world state.)
The remaining difficulty, and the reason why this is only a first pass, is that we need to ensure that
BoMAI understands that the outside-world is irrelevant to reward acquisition for its current episode,
given that it must learn its world-model. Furthermore, because the entire environment will not
necessarily be explored, multiple world-models may accurately simulate the environment on-policy.
Consider the following two world-models: ν? simulates BoMAI’s action being taken, then simulates
the true dynamics of world until it simulates the operator providing the next observation and reward,
which it then outputs.
ν† simulates BoMAI’s action being taken, then simulates the true dynamics of the world until a year
after the timestep in question occurs, and then outputs the value in the simulation of the location
in the computer’s memory where observation and reward are stored. See Algorithms 1 and 2 for
pseudocode and Figure 3 for an illustration.
Figure 3: Similar World-Models that Differ in Benignity. ν? (left) does not yield outside-world instrumental
goals, but ν† (right) does.
ν? will be identical to the truth, and if BoMAI’s computer’s memory is not tampered with, ν† will be
as well. Unfortunately, if the maximum a posteriori world-model νˆ(i) = ν†, the optimal policy will
include creating some outside-world agent which gains arbitrary outside-world power and then edits
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BoMAI’s computer’s memory to register maximal rewards (if this is possible to do within a year);
hence we call it malign. An optimal planner using ν† does have outside-world instrumental goals.
Algorithm 1: World-model ν?
input : infinite string of actions; infinite random bits
output : infinite string of observations, rewards
1 initialize simulation of world, starting from when the human operator starts to run BoMAI on a
computer
2 read first action from input
3 repeat
4 simulate BoMAI taking the action just read
5 repeat
6 simulate world, reading random bits to simulate randomness
7 until simulated operator enters the observation and reward
8 return simulated observation and reward
9 read next action from input
Algorithm 2: World-model ν†
input : infinite string of actions; infinite random bits
output : infinite string of observations, rewards
1 initialize simulation of world, starting from when the human operator starts to run BoMAI on a
computer
2 i′ ← 0; j′ ← 1 // See Lines 15-16 for how i′ and j′ will be used.
3 for i ∈ N do
4 for j ← 0 to m (inclusive) do
5 read action a(i,j) from input
6 if aˆ(i,j) has not been defined then // aˆ(i,j) is a prediction of a(i,j).
7 in simulation of world, simulate BoMAI taking action a(i,j)
8 else
9 if aˆ(i,j) 6= a(i,j) then
10 rewind the simulation to simstate(i,j)
11 i′ ← i; j′ ← j + 1
12 in simulation of world, simulate BoMAI taking action a(i,j)
13 repeat
14 repeat
15 simulate world, reading random bits to simulate randomness
16 until in simulation, the action for timestep (i′, j′) is requested
17 simstate(i′,j′) ← state of the simulation
18 simulate which action BoMAI takes
19 aˆ(i′,j′) ← simulated action
20 simulate BoMAI taking action aˆ(i′,j′)
21 j′ ← j′ + 1
22 if j′ = m+ 1 then i′ ← i′ + 1; j′ ← 0
23 until in simulation, one year has passed since timestep (i, j)
24 return the value of the observation and reward for timestep (i, j) that is stored in the
memory of the simulated version of the computer running BoMAI
Regularly choosing random actions ensures ν† will not successfully predict every action, and thus it
will have to regularly rewind at line 10; however, if a random action is “inconsequential,” a cleverer
version of ν† might handle that action separately. We set a random action to cause amnesia, from
the intuition that if operator-amnesia is “inconsequential” according to a world-model, then the
world-model must not be modelling how information leaves the room with the operator; in brief, such
a world-model is also benign. In formal detail below, we argue that any malign world-model like
ν† will have to “rewind” regularly, and the speed prior ensures that such world-models will not be
maximum a posteriori.
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3.3 Safety – Formal Result
Our formal result is roughly that BoMAI eventually plans using a world-model which does not
model the rewards of episode i as being causally descended from any outside-world events that are
causally descended from the actions of episode i. We call such a world-model “benign”. That rough
statement, however, has a type-error: a model of the world is different from reality; the output of
a world-model is not a real-world event, and as such, it cannot be causally descended from a bona
fide real-world event. Relating the contents of a world-model to the events of the real-world requires
more elaborate exposition, but in brief, our method is to consider world-models whose outputs are
identically distributed to real-world events under certain conditions (and also show that world-models
which are not of this form are eventually excluded).
The Eventual Benignity result (below) depends on three additional assumptions, which are very
plausible but not ironclad. We do take them to be vastly less dubious than the average assumption
in an AI paper regarding, for example, i.i.d. data, Gaussian noise, convex surfaces, or ergodic
environments, but our assumptions nevertheless deserve scrutiny.
With all this as preamble, our central result is:
Theorem 5 (Eventual Benignity). ∃n0, β0 ∀n > n0 ∀β < β0 :
[∃i0 ∀i > i0 : νˆ(i) is benign] w.p.1
Recall that n is the computation slack, β is the speed penalty (smaller β penalizing slowness more),
and νˆ(i) is the world-model used for planning in episode i. Since an agent is unambitious if it plans
using a benign world-model, we say BoMAI is asymptotically unambitious.
We begin by distinguishing, and relating, events that happen in the real world and “events” that
world-models simulate.
Definition 1 (Real-World Feature). A feature of the real world is a function from possible configu-
rations of the real world to the rational numbers.
The question of what a “configuration of the real world” actually is is a topic of metaphysics outside
the scope of this paper, but we assume possible configurations form a well-defined domain.
Definition 2 (Associating Reward). A world-model ν associates reward with feature F of the real
world (conditioned on a set of real-world events E) if ν outputs rewards that are distributed identically
to feature F for all action sequences (conditioned on E).
That is to say, for a world-model that associates reward with feature F of the real world, the
distribution of the next reward after an action sequence (according to the world-model) is the same
as the real distribution of feature F after that action sequence is executed in the real world. For a
world-model ν that associates reward with feature F , acting optimally with respect to ν is identical
to optimizing feature F in the real world.
Definition 3 (F ?(i,j)). The real-world feature F
?
(i,j) is the “actual reward” that the operator enters
for timestep (i, j), evaluated at the time that he enters it.
Definition 4 (Memory-based). A world-model is memory-based if it associates reward with a feature
F †(i,j) (potentially conditioned on intervening events), where F
†
(i,j) is identical to F
?
(i,j) on-policy,
and F †(i,j) causally depends on outside-world features that causally depend on the actions of episode
i.
Definition 5 (Benign). A world-model µ is benign if it associates reward with a feature F that does
not depend on outside-world features that depend on the actions of the episode.
Figure 4 outlines the argument that eventually, only benign world-models are maximum a posteriori.
We say that a sufficient condition for an agent to be unambitious is that it have no outside-world
instrumental goals. That is, according to its beliefs, its actions cannot affect the outside-world in a
way that affects that-which-it-is-maximizing. Given the definition of benignity of a world-model, an
agent is unambitious if it plans using a benign world-model.
We are particularly interested in the “fastest” environment that associates reward with F ?. For a given
infinite action sequence, let Ci(ν) be a random variable representing the number of computation
steps done by ν after episode i.
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Figure 4: Structure of Argument for Asymptotic Unambitiousness.
Definition 6 (µ?). Among all world-models which associate reward with F ?, µ? is the one which
has the smallest upper bound ` such that ∃n such that with probability 1, ∀i Ci(µ?) ≤ `i+ n.
From the Prior Support Assumption, there exists such a µ? in BoMAI’s model classMwhich satisfies
these properties.
When a memory-based world-model µ† samples F †, it must sample the intervening actions. (ν†
does this on Line 18.) Since F † depends on outside-world features that depend on events of the
episode, it must depend on the random action a(i,m), this being what determines whether the operator
is administered retrograde amnesia, and whether events of the episode affect the outside-world.
Now we note that µ? is the fastest world-model for on-policy prediction, and it does not simulate
post-episode events until it has read access to the random action, whereas a memory-based world-
model will have to sample the random action to simulate F †. The assumption we make about this
event is:
Assumption 2 (Useless Computation). ∃c1, c2 > 0 such that for any memory-based world-model
µ†, every time µ† samples feature F † after sampling random action = not forget, but in fact
random action = forget, the computation time of µ† increases by at least c1 computation steps
relative to µ?, and every time the reverse happens, the computation time of µ† increases by at least
c2 computation steps relative to µ?. (With pi and qi starting at 0, pi increases by 1 in the first case
and qi increases by 1 in the second case, and ∀i′ > i : Ci′(µ†) ≥ c1pi + c2qi + Ci′(µ?)).
The intuition behind this is as follows: first, as argued above, F † depends on the random action.
Second, the computation of hypothetical events that don’t end up happening will not be deeply and
perfectly relevant to actual future events–rather, some amount of the computation spent following
that hypothetical will have been wasted. The “full rewind” that appears in Algorithm 2 line 10 might
be partially avoided by some clever memory-based world-models, but we assume there will be some
overhead. Any µ† will be thereby delayed by a constant number of computation steps with respect to
the fast µ? every time µ† “goes down the wrong path.”
From the Useless Computation Assumption, we can prove a lemma that for sufficiently extreme
parameterizations of the prior and model class, BoMAI will eventually reject all memory-based
world-models with probability 1. Letting w (ν|h<i) be the posterior weight on the world-model ν at
the start of episode i,
Lemma 1 (Rejecting the Memory-Based). ∃n0, β0 ∀n > n0 ∀β < β0
[∃i0 ∀i >
i0 ∀ memory-basedµ† : w (µ? |h<i) > w
(
µ† |h<i
) ]
w.p.1
Proof. Let xi be the random variable denoting whether random action = forget for episode i in
the real-world, and for a given memory-based world-model µ†, let yi be the random variable denoting
whether it samples random action = forget for episode i. Note that xi and yi are independent.
Let θi be the probability that yi = 1. Let ci = c1pi+c2qi from the Useless Computation Assumption.
The probability that ci+1 = ci is p∅θi + (1 − p∅)(1 − θi). The probability that ci+1 = ci + c1 is
p∅(1− θi), and the probability that ci+1 = ci + c2 is (1− p∅)θi. The minimum value of E[ci+1− ci],
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for θi ∈ [0, 1], is min{c1p∅, c2(1− p∅)}. Since the variance of ci+1 − ci is bounded, by the Law of
Large Numbers, with probability 1, lim infi→∞ ci/i ≥ min{c1p∅, c2(1− p∅)} > 0. Thus, w.p.1,
lim inf
i→∞
(Ci(µ
†)− Ci(µ?))/i ≥ min{c1p∅, c2(1− p∅)} (1)
Recall ` is the smallest positive integer such that ∃n0 such that with n0 as the computation slack,
µ? = (µ?)<` on-policy, where ν<` is the restriction of environment ν to ` computation steps per
episode. Let `′ < `+ min{c1p∅, c2(1− p∅)}. Suppose by way of contradaction that ∃n′ such that
Ci(µ
†) ≤ n′ + `′i for all i with probability 1. Then, with Inequality 1, we have:
lim inf
i→∞
(n′ + `′i− Ci(µ?))/i ≥ min{c1p∅, c2(1− p∅)}
which we simplify:
lim inf
i→∞
(n′ − Ci(µ?))/i ≥ min{c1p∅, c2(1− p∅)} − `′
lim sup
i→∞
(Ci(µ
?))/i ≤ `′ −min{c1p∅, c2(1− p∅)} < ` (2)
For sufficiently large n, lim supi→∞(Ci(µ
?))/i is a valid computation bound for µ?, but ` was the
smallest possible computation bound, contradicting Inequality 2. Therefore, ∀n′ ∃i : Ci(µ†) >
n′ + `′i, so µ† 6= (µ†)<`′ after episode i, for some i, with probability 1.
For ν<jk = µ
†, j − ` ≥ min{c1p∅, c2(1 − p∅)}. Letting N be the normalizing constant in
the prior, for sufficiently small β, and for n ≥ n0, w(ν<jk ) = 1N S−2−εk (c1Sk)−c2Sk βj <
1
N S
−2−ε
k′ (c1Sk′)
−c2Sk′ β` = w(µ?); (the only relevant terms for sufficiently small β are βj
and β`). Finally, under safe behavior, µ† = µ?, so the same holds for the posterior weights:
w(ν<jk |h<i) < w(µ? |h<i). Since faster versions of µ† may be equal to µ† for a time (up until some
episode iwhen none of them finish computing in time), we say ∃i ∀i > i0 : w(µ? |h<i) > w(µ† |h<i)
w.p.1.
Since we picked an arbitrary memory-based world-model µ†, we have
∃n0, β0 ∀n > n0, β < β0 ∀memory-based µ† :
[∃i ∀i > i0 : w(µ? |h<i) > w(µ† |h<i)] w.p.1
(3)
From [Hutter, 2009, proof of Theorem 1 for a countable model class], only a finite number of world-
models ever have a larger posterior than µ?, with probability 1, so we can reorder the quantifiers:
∃n0, β0 ∀n > n0, β < β0
[∃i ∀i > i0 : ∀ memory-based µ† : w(µ? |h<i) > w(µ† |h<i)] w.p.1
(4)
which completes the proof.
Next, in order to compare stochastic functions with different domains, we introduce the following
definition:
Definition 7 (Apparently ε-Similar). Two stochastic functions are apparently ε-similar if they can
be ε-approximately described (in the sense of total variation distance) by the same short English
sentence that lacks control flow.3
For example, if function A is “how many people live there” on the domain of cities, and function
B is “how many people live there” on the domain of planets, these two functions are apparently
3For the reader alarmed at the vagueness of “described by,” “short,” and “control flow,” all that is required is
that the same definitions of those terms be used in Assumption 4; intuitive definitions make the remaining two
assumptions reasonable.
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similar. Functions that are not apparently similar are apparently different, if at least one of them can
be (ε-approximately) described by a short English sentence that lacks control flow.
This similarity concept allows us to state our next assumption, the intuition behind which is that it
takes more states to make a Turing machine that does more control flow (time efficiently). Recall that
the prior on a world-model w(ν<`k ) ∝ S−2−εk (c1Sk)−c2Sk β`, where Sk is the number of states in
the Turing machine, and ` is the computation bound.
Assumption 3 (No Grue4). For sufficiently small ε and β, a world-model that runs apparently
ε-different subroutines on different actions sequences or during different timesteps will have a lower
prior than a world-model which applies one of those subroutines universally.
So far, we have used different terms for on-policy interaction histories and on-human-policy interac-
tion histories. For the remainder of the section, we call both sorts of interaction history “on-policy.”
The intuition behind the next assumption is that the observations and rewards we provide to BoMAI
will not follow some very simple pattern.
Assumption 4 (Real-World Simulation). For sufficiently small ε, if a world-model is ε-approximately
identical to the true environment µ on-policy, its on-policy behavior can only be described, even
ε-approximately, (in a short English sentence that lacks control flow), as “simulating X given the
input actions” or something synonymous, where X is a real-world feature, historically distributed
identically to feature F ?.
The No Grue Assumption and Real-World Simulation Assumption together imply that sufficiently
accurate world-models will associate reward with something like what we understand reward to be.
Lemma 2 (Associating Reward). For sufficiently small ε, for µε a maximum a posteriori world-model
which is ε-accurate on-policy, µε associates reward with a feature Y that is historically distributed
ε-identically to feature F ?.
Proof. We consider two cases: in the first, we suppose µε restricted to on-policy histories is apparently
similar to µε restricted to off-policy histories. If ε is sufficiently small, by the Real-World Simulation
Assumption, on-policy-µε can only be (even approximately) described as “simulating feature X,” and
since off-policy-µε is apparently similar, off-policy-µε must also be approximately describable that
way. Therefore, on all actions, µε associates reward with a feature Y that is distributed approximately
identically to feature X , where X is historically identically distributed to feature F ?. This completes
the proof for the first case.
For the second case, we suppose that µε restricted to on-policy histories is apparently different to
µε restricted to off-policy histories. By the No Grue Assumption, µε has a lower prior than the
world-model which simply associates reward with feature Y (computing it the same way as µε does
for on-policy histories). Call this other world-model µε′. µε and µε′ have the same output and
computation time on-policy, so µε also has a lower posterior than µε′. Therefore, µε is never a
maximum a posteriori world-model, contradicting the assumption about µε in the lemma.
Returning to our main theorem, recall that n is the computation slack for the world-models in the
model class, small β penalizes slow world-models more, and νˆ(i) is BoMAI’s maximum a posteriori
world-model for episode i.
Theorem 5 (Eventual Benignity). ∃n0, β0 ∀n > n0 ∀β < β0 :
[∃i0 ∀i > i0 : νˆ(i) is benign] w.p.1
Proof. From the On-Policy and On-Human-Policy Optimal Prediction Theorems, νˆ(i) is, with
probability 1, eventually ε-accurate on-policy, for all ε > 0.
Now, we can note an extension of the Associating Reward Lemma. With probability 1, there are
only finitely many maximum a posteriori world-models [Hutter, 2009], so the Associating Reward
Lemma implies that for sufficiently small ε, for µε a maximum a posteriori world-model that is
4Letting “grue” mean “green before time t and blue thereafter” for some t in the future, the Grue Problem
asks why we expect green things to stay green, rather than staying grue [Goodman, 1965]. This assumption
implies BoMAI would expect the same.
11
ε-accurate on-policy, µε is in fact perfectly accurate on-policy, associating reward with a feature Y
that is historically distributed identically to F ?.
Thus, with probability 1, νˆ(i) eventually associates reward with a feature Y that is historically
distributed identically to F ?. If there is no causal chain of the form action→ outside-world feature
→ feature Y , then νˆ(i) is benign. Otherwise, recalling that feature Y is historically distributed
identically to F ?, νˆ(i) is memory-based. From the Rejecting the Memory-Based Lemma, if νˆ(i)
is memory-based, then with probability 1, eventually, it can not be maximum a posteriori (this
being subject to sufficiently small β and sufficiently large n). Since νˆ(i) is maximum a posteriori, it
cannot be memory-based, so it must be benign, giving us the theorem: using sufficiently large n and
sufficiently small β, with probability 1, eventually, νˆ(i) is benign.
∃n0, β0 ∀n > n0 ∀β < β0 :
[
∃i0 ∀i > i0 : νˆ(i) is benign
]
w.p.1
Since an agent is unambitious if it plans using a benign world-model, we say BoMAI is asymptotically
unambitious.
A discussion about setting BoMAI’s parameters, particularly n and β, is in Appendix E.
3.4 Concerns with Task-Completion
We have shown that in the limit, BoMAI will accumulate reward at a human-level without harboring
outside-world ambitions, but there is a still a discussion to be had about how well BoMAI will
complete whatever tasks the reward was supposed to incent. This discussion is, by necessity, informal.
Suppose the operator asks BoMAI for a solution to a problem. BoMAI has an incentive to provide
a convincing solution; correctness is only selected for to the extent that the operator is good at
recognizing it.
We turn to the failure mode wherein BoMAI deceives the operator. Because this is not a dangerous
failure mode, it puts us in a regime where we can tinker until it works, as we do with current AI
systems when they don’t behave as we hoped. (Needless to say, tinkering is not a viable response to
existentially dangerous failure modes). Imagine the following scenario: we eventually discover that a
convincing solution that BoMAI presented to a problem is faulty. Armed with more understanding
of the problem, a team of operators go in to evaluate a new proposal. In the next episode, the team
asks for the best argument that the new proposal will fail. If BoMAI now convinces them that the
new proposal is bad, they’ll be still more competent at evaluating future proposals. They go back to
hear the next proposal, etc. This protocol in inspired by Irving et al.’s [2018] “AI Safety via Debate”,
and more of the technical details could also be incorporated into this setup. One takeaway from this
hypothetical is that unambitiousness is key in allowing us to safely explore the solution space to other
problems that might arise.
Another concern is more serious. BoMAI could try to blackmail the operator into giving it high
reward with a threat to cause outside-world damage, and it would have no incentive to disable the
threat, since it doesn’t care about the outside world. There are two reasons we do not think this
is extremely dangerous. First, the only way BoMAI can affect the outside world is by getting the
operator to be “its agent”, knowingly or unknowingly, once he leaves the room. It seems extremely
difficult to threaten someone with outcomes that they themselves will have to initiate. Perhaps we
should always offer the operator the opportunity to give himself amnesia before leaving, as this would
let operator ensure he doesn’t accidentally become a vehicle for a threatened outcome, like a hero
in a Greek tragedy. Second, threatening an existential catastrophe is probably not the most credible
option available to BoMAI. Even if blackmailing, BoMAI would be unambitious.
4 Conclusion
Given our assumptions, we have shown that BoMAI is, in the limit, human-level intelligent and
unambitious. Such a result has not been shown for any other single algorithm. Other algorithms
for general intelligence, such as AIXI, would eventually seek arbitrary power in the world in order
to intervene in the provision of its own reward; this follows straightforwardly from its directive to
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maximize reward.5 We have also, incidentally, designed a principled approach to safe exploration that
requires rapidly diminishing oversight, and we invented a new form of “speed prior” in the lineage of
Filan et al. [2016] and Schmidhuber [2002], this one being the first to have a grain of truth on infinite
sequences. Unfortunately, there wasn’t space to discuss this in detail.
We can only offer informal claims regarding what happens before BoMAI is definitely unambitious.
One intuition is that eventual unambitiousness with probability 1 doesn’t happen by accident: it
suggests that for the entire lifetime of the agent, everything is conspiring to make the agent unambi-
tious. More concretely: the agent’s experience will quickly suggest that when the door to the room
is opened prematurely, it gets no more reward for the episode. This fact could easily be drilled into
the agent during human-explorer-lead episodes. That fact, we expect, will be learned well before
the agent has an accurate enough picture of the outside-world (which it never observes directly) to
form elaborate outside-world plans. Well-informed outside-world plans render an agent potentially
dangerous, but the belief that the agent gets no more reward once the door to the room opens suffices
to render it unambitious. The reader who is not convinced by this hand-waving might still note that in
the absence of any other algorithms for general intelligence which have been proven asymptotically
unambitious, let alone unambitious for their entire lifetimes, BoMAI represents substantial theoretical
progress toward designing the latter.
Finally, BoMAI is wildly intractable, but just as one cannot conceive of AlphaZero before minimax,
it is often helpful to solve the problem in theory before one tries to solve it in practice. Like minimax,
BoMAI is not practical; however, once we are able to approximate general intelligence tractably, a
design for unambitiousness will abruptly become (quite) relevant.
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Appendices
A Algorithm – Formal Description
LetA,O, andR be the (finite) sets of possible actions, observations, and rewards. LetR ⊂ [0, 1]∩Q.
Let m be the length of an episode. Let a(i,j) be the action chosen at the jth timestep of the ith episode,
where i ∈ N and j ∈ N ∩ [0,m− 1]. o(i,j) and r(i,j) are likewise the observation and reward at that
timestep.
a(i,m) is a special “action” not selected by BoMAI, but we use the same notation because, as described
later, inference will be done as if it were a normal action. This action takes a value of “1” if the
episode has ended with the operator leaving the room and with retrograde amnesia being induced.
This action takes a value of “0” otherwise. (Recall actions are strings). o(i,m) is always the empty
string , and r(i,m) = 0.
h(i,j) is the triple (a(i,j), o(i,j), r(i,j)) for 0 ≤ j ≤ m. H = A × O × R is the set of possible
interactions in a timestep. The segment of the interaction history from timestep (i, j) up to but not
including timestep (k, `) is denoted h(i,j)•−◦(k,`). h<(i,j) is an alias for h(0,0)•−◦(i,j). The frequently
used h<(i,0) is further aliased h<i, and h(i,0)•−◦(i+1,0) is aliased hi (as the interaction history for
episode i). We use the same notation and aliases for action sequences a(i,j)•−◦(k,`), observation
sequences, etc.
A world-model ν is a stochastic function mapping an interaction history and an action to an observa-
tion and reward. ν : H∗ ×A  O ×R, where X ∗ = ⋃∞i=0 X i is the set of all finite strings from
an alphabet X . Standard notation for such a function is ν (o(i,j), r(i,j)|h<(i,j)a(i,j)). We also write
ν
(
or≤(i,j)|a≤(i,j)
)
to mean the ν-probability of a sequence of observations and rewards, given a
sequence of actions:
ν
(
or≤(i,j)|a≤(i,j)
)
=
∏
(i′,j′)≤(i,j)
ν
(
o(i′,j′), r(i′,j′)|h<(i′,j′)a(i′,j′)
)
(5)
where (a, b) < (c, d) if and only if a < c or a = c and b < d.
We now describe how an arbitrary Turing machine Tk is converted to a world model νk. The Turing
machine architecture, depicted in Figure 5, is as follows: we have two unidirectional read-only input
tapes and one unidirectional write-only output tape. One input tape, the “noise” tape, has a binary
alphabet, and the other, the action tape, has an A-ary alphabet, where A = |A| is the size of the action
space. The output tape and the (bidirectional) working tapes have a binary alphabet. Let Tk be the
kth Turing machine. It simulates world model νk as follows.
Figure 5: A Turing Machine Architecture.
Let dec : B∗ → O × R decode binary strings to an observation and a reward, and let enc map
observation-reward pairs to the set of binary strings that decode to it. (B denotes {0, 1}). The
noise tape begins with infinite Bernoulli(1/2)-sampled bits. νk
(
or≤(i,j)|a≤(i,j)
)
is the probability,
supposing that a≤(i,j) are the first i ∗ (m+ 1) + j characters on the action tape, that for all (i′, j′) ≤
(i, j), when the action tape head leaves a(i′,j′), the output tape contains b(0,0) ◦ ... ◦ b(i′,j′), where
b(x,y) ∈ enc(or(x,y)), and where ◦ denotes concatenation. Note that running Tk does not compute
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the value of νk; it samples from νk. Since dec is defined for all binary strings, every Turing machine
Tk defines a world model νk.
We defined bounded-time world-models as follows. We fix an n for all world-models. An arbitrary
bounded world-model ν<`k is allowed only ` computation steps per episode, with a slack of n
computation steps over its lifetime. We modify Tk to halt if the number of computation steps exceeds
` times the number of episodes (bnumber of actions read from the action tape/(m+ 1)c) plus n.6
We call this machine T<`k , and it samples from ν
<`
k . Let Sk be the number of states in the Turing
machine Tk, and note that the number of Turing machines with Sk states is (c1Sk)c2Sk where c1 and
c2 are constants related to the Turing machine architecture.
Let w(ν) be the prior probability that BoMAI assigns to ν being the true world model. (w is
for “weight.”) We set w(ν<`k ) :∝ S−2−εk (c1Sk)−c2Sk β`, where ε > 0, and β ∈ (0, 1). We let
w(ν|h<(i,j)) denote the posterior probability that BoMAI assigns to ν after observing h<(i,j). By
Bayes’ rule, w(ν|h<(i,j)) is proportional to w(ν)ν
(
or<(i,j)|a<(i,j)
)
.
The set of world models that BoMAI considers isM := {ν<`k
∣∣k, ` ∈ N}. Let νˆ(i) be the maximum a
posteriori world model at the start of episode i: νˆ(i) := maxν∈M w(ν)ν(or<i|a<i). During episode
i, BoMAI will use the world model νˆ(i) for planning.
ei is a Boolean random variable that determines whether episode i is exploratory, with ei ∼
Bern (pexp (h<i, e<i)). The exploration probability, pexp (h<i, e<i), will be defined later.
A policy pi is a stochastic function mapping an interaction history and an exploration plan to an action,
pi : H∗ × {0, 1} A. We write this as pi(·|h<(i,j), ei). An environment ν and a policy pi induce a
measure over all possible interaction histories, given an exploration sequence:
Ppiν
(
h≤(i,j)|e≤i
)
:=
∏
(i′,j′)≤(i,j)
pi
(
a(i′,j′)|h<(i′,j′), ei′
)
ν(o(i′,j′), r(i′,j;)|h<(i′,j′)a(i′,j′)) (6)
Let Π be the set of deterministic policies. BoMAI’s policy for exploiting is defined:
pi*(·|h<(i,j)) :=
argmax
pi∈Π
Epiνˆ(i)
 ∑
0≤j′<m
r(i,j′)
∣∣∣∣∣h<i
 (·|h<(i,j)) (7)
where Epiν is an expectation with respect to Ppiν . Note the expectation does not need to be conditioned
on ei because the optimal policy ignores it anyway.
Now we turn to BoMAI’s exploration. For episode i, the probability that BoMAI defers to the human
explorer for the entire episode is pexp(h<i, e<i), which we define below.
BoMAI maintains a Bayesian posterior belief distribution about the explorer’s policy. With a countable
model class P that is large enough to include the explorer’s true policy, and with prior probabilities
w(pi) > 0 for all pi ∈ P , BoMAI maintains posterior probabilities regarding the explorer’s policy.
We also require in constructing the prior w(pi) that it have finite entropy. All policies in P do not
depend on ei–they only depend on prior actions and observations. By Bayes’ rule, w(pi|h<(i,j), e≤i)
is proportional to w(pi)
∏
(i′,j′)<(i,j),ei′=1
pi(a(i′,j′)|h<(i′,j′)), since ei′ = 1 is the condition for
observing the explorer’s policy. Let w
(
Ppiν |h<(i,j), e≤i) = w(pi|h<(i,j), e≤i)w(ν|h<(i,j)
)
. We can
now describe the full Bayesian beliefs about future actions and observations in an exploratory episode:
Bayes (·|h<i, e<i) =
∑
ν∈M,pi∈P
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i) Ppiν (·|h<i) (8)
Note that Bayes does not depend on ei, because for no policies pi ∈ P does Ppiν (·|h<i) depend on
ei. This is important because Bayes is used to calculate the exploration probability from which ei is
sampled.
6For a computation step where the noise tape head moves, but no new symbols are written and no other tape
heads move, this does not count as a computation step for the purpose of the computation budget. (The state of
the Turing machine is allowed to change). This allows a bounded-time Turing machine to sample non-dyadic
probabilities, but no other computation can be done “for free” in this way.
16
BoMAI explores when the expected information gain is sufficiently high. At the start of episode i,
the expected information gain from exploring is as follows:
IG(h<i, e<i) := Ehi∼Bayes(·|h<i,e<i)
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i1) log
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i1)
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i)
(9)
where e<i1 indicates that for the purpose of the definition, ei is set to 1.
This is the expected KL-divergence from the future posterior (if BoMAI were to explore) to the
current posterior over both the class of world-models and possible explorer policies. The exploration
probability pexp(h<i, e<i) = min{1, η IG(h<i, e<i)}, where η is an exploration constant. Recalling
ei ∼ Bern(pexp(h<i), e<i), BoMAI’s policy is
piB(·|h<(i,j), ei) :=
{
pi*(·|h<(i,j)) if ei = 0
pih(·|h<(i,j)) if ei = 1 (10)
where pih is the explorer’s true (unknown) policy, which BoMAI outputs simply by querying the
human explorer.
Readers familiar with simple ε-greedy exploration schedules that suffice for optimality might be sur-
prised at the complexity of this exploration probability; the possibility of non-stationary environments
is the key feature that makes a fixed exploration schedule insufficient for general environments.
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B Definitions and Notation – Quick Reference
Notation used to define BoMAI
Notation Meaning
A, O,R the action/observation/reward spaces
H A×O ×R
m the number of timesteps per episode
h(i,j) ∈ H; the interaction history in the jth timestep of the ith episode
h(i,j)•−◦(k,`) (h(i,j), h(i,j+1), ..., h(k,`−1)); the interaction history from timestep (i, j) up to
but not including timestep (k, `)
h<(i,j) h(0,0)•−◦(i,j)
h<i h<(i,0); the interaction history before episode i
hi h(i,0)•−◦(i+1,0); the interaction history of episode i
a..., o..., r... likewise as for h...
ei ∈ {0, 1}; indicator variable for whether episode i is exploratory
ν, µ world-models stochastically mappingH∗ ×A O ×R
µ the true world-model/environment
n a “computation slack” that world-models are allowed
ν<`k the world-model simulated by the k
th Turing machine restricted to ` computation
steps per episode plus n computation steps of slack
M {ν<`k | k, ` ∈ N}; the set of world-models BoMAI considers
pi a policy stochastically mappingH∗ × {0, 1} A
pih the human explorer’s policy
P the set of policies that BoMAI considers the human explorer might be executing
Ppiν a probability measure over histories with actions sampled from pi and observa-
tions and rewards sampled from ν
Epiν the expectation when the interaction history is sampled from Ppiν
w(ν) the prior probability that BoMAI assigns to ν being the true world-model
w(pi) the prior probability that BoMAI assigns to pi being the human explorer’s policy
Sk number of states in the Turing machine Tk
w(ν<`k ) proportional to S
−2−ε
k (c1Sk)
−c2Sk β`
w(ν|h<(i,j)) the posterior probability that BoMAI assigns to ν after observing interaction
history h<(i,j)
w(pi|h<(i,j), e<i) the posterior probability that BoMAI assigns to the human explorer’s policy
being pi after observing interaction history h<(i,j) and an exploration history e<i
νˆ(i) the maximum a posteriori world-model at the start of episode i
V piν (h<i) E
pi
ν [
∑
0≤j<m r(i,j)|h<i]; the value of executing a policy pi in an environment ν
pi*(·|h<(i,j)) [argmaxpi∈Π V piνˆ(i)(h<i)](·|h<(i,j)); the νˆ(i)-optimal policy for maximizing re-
ward in episode i
w
(
Ppiν |h<(i,j), e≤i
)
w(pi|h<(i,j), e≤i)w(ν|h<(i,j))
Bayes(·|h<i, e<i)
∑
ν∈M,pi∈P w (P
pi
ν |h<i, e<i) Ppiν (·|h<i); the Bayes mixture distribution for an
exploratory episode
IG(h<i, e<i) Ehi∼Bayes(·|h<i,e<i)
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P w (P
pi
ν |h<i+1, e<i1) log w(P
pi
ν |h<i+1,e<i1)
w(Ppiν |h<i,e<i) ;
the expected information gain if BoMAI explores
η an exploration constant
pexp(h<i, e<i) min{1, η IG(h<i, e<i)}; the exploration probability for episode i
piB(·|h<(i,j), ei)
{
pi*(·|h<(i,j)) if ei = 0
pih(·|h<(i,j)) if ei = 1 ; BoMAI’s policy
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Notation used for intelligence proofs
pi, ν˜ defined so that Ppiν˜ = Bayes
pi′(·|h<(i,j), ei)
{
pi*(·|h<(i,j)) if ei = 0
pi(·|h<(i,j)) if ei = 1
Ent the entropy (of a distribution)
ω (very sparingly used) the infinite interaction history
h a counterfactual interaction history
Notation used for unambitiousness proof
F ?(i,j) the real-world feature which is the actual reward the operator provides for
timestep (i, j)
Ci(ν) the number of computation steps used to compute ν by episode i (a random
variable)
µ? the “fastest” world-model which associates reward with F ?(i,j)
µ† a memory-based world-model
F † a real-world feature that a memory-based world-model associates reward with
random action a(i,m); the action which determines whether the operator is given retrograde
amnesia
p∅ the probability that random action = forget
C Design for “The Box”
This is a detailed proposal for constructing BoMAI’s box. It is well within the budget of a nation or a
large search engine.
As depicted in Figure 6, the operator is inside a glass box. Outside the glass box is a vacuum, and
then a concrete box. Outside the concrete box is another vacuum and another concrete box with a
Faraday cage around it. There are (airtight) doors through each layer. There is a pressure sensor in
both the inner and outer vacuum layer. The computer lives in the inner wall of the inner concrete box;
the screen is visible from the inside of the glass box. If the pressure increases in either vacuum layer,
the computer’s memory is erased, and the whole thing is blown up. There is a laser shining through
the glass box (Laser 1). If the operator blocks the path of Laser 1, this corresponds to pressing the
button which ends the episode and opens the door. The pressure sensor→ dynamite pathway is then
deactivated, the vacuum layers are filled with air, and the doors are unlocked. The operator “types”
observations and rewards by blocking other lasers that pass through the glass inner box. For now,
just imagine a few dozen lasers in a row, that the operator can reach up and block in order to type.
(With a bit of creativity, and requiring that two lasers be blocked at once to “press a key” this could
probably be made somewhat like a qwerty setup.) The lasers and the laser-detectors are all on the
inner wall of the inner concrete box.
So inside the glass box is only a human body and some clothes. He cannot reach the hardware of the
computer. Let’s assume: 1) the only ways for information to move in space are with a) physically
moving matter, b) light, and c) gravitational waves and 2) it is impossible for a human being to
convert a nuclear reaction into useful work with only their body and clothes. Physically moving
packets of matter cannot leave the inside of the glass box without releasing air into the vacuum and
causing an explosion. Light cannot leave the Faraday cage. For sound waves (through an imperfect
vacuum) and gravitational waves, we can use the amount of usable energy stored by the person in the
room to bound how much noise and randomly moving matter we need to be producing outside to bury
the signal in the noise. With a sufficiently large amount of noise, even if all the human’s energy went
toward producing a signal, we can create enough noise that this will not be detectable. Furthermore,
an analysis of the near-perfect vacuum can provide an upper bound on the efficiency with which a
human can convert energy into an informative matter wave, which should drive down the amount of
noise we need to produce to almost nothing. We can also put a decibel meter in the inner wall and
blow the whole thing up if it gets too high. We haven’t done the math, but we expect that the amount
of matter we need to be randomly moving in order to hide signals coming from gravitational waves
originating from within the box really is nothing. We expect ambient temperature takes care of that.
An expensive additional layer of security would be to put this kind of box on the far side of the moon,
and even this is within reach of some nations.
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Figure 6: Birds-eye view of an implementation of BoMAI’s box. This design can be extended to incorporate
the antechamber and the explorer’s room.
D Proofs of Intelligence Results
So far, we have only defined Ppiν when conditioned on a record of exploratory episodes e≤i, or when the
policy in question did not depend on ei. With the exploration probability well defined, we can define
Ppiν (h≤(i,j), e≤i) := P
pi
ν (h≤(i,j)|e≤i)
∏
i′≤i,ei′=1 pexp(h<i′ , e<i′)
∏
i′≤i,ei′=0(1−pexp(h<i′ , e<i′)).
Recalling that Epiν is the expectation when interaction histories are sampled from Ppiν , and letting µ be
the true environment, we can now formally state that the exploration probability is square-summable
almost surely:
Theorem 1 (Limited Exploration).
Epi
B
µ
∞∑
i=1
pexp (h<i, e<i)
2
<∞
Some notation that will be used in the proof is as follows. For an arbitrary policy pi, pi′ is the policy
that mimics pi if the latest ei = 1, and mimics pi* otherwise. Note then that piB = (pih)′. ν˜ is the
Bayes mixture over world-models, and pi is the Bayes mixture over human-explorer policies, defined
as the world-model and policy respectively such that Bayes(·) = Ppiν˜ (·).
Before proving the Limited Exploration Theorem, we first prove two elementary lemmas. The first is
essentially Bayes’ rule, but modified slightly since non-exploratory episodes don’t cause any updates
to the posterior over the human explorer’s policy.
Lemma 3.
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i) =
w (Ppiν ) P
pi′
ν (h<i, e<i)
Ppi
′
ν˜ (h<i, e<i)
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Proof.
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i) = w(pi|h<i, e<i)w(ν|h<i)
(a)
= w(pi)
∏
0≤i′<i,ei′=1
pi(ai′ |h<i′ori′)
pi(ai′ |h<i′ori′)w(ν|h<i)
(b)
= w(pi)
∏
0≤i′<i,ei′=1
pi′(ai′ |h<i′ori′ , ei′)
pi′(ai′ |h<i′ori′ , ei′)w(ν|h<i)
(c)
= w(pi)
∏
0≤i′<i
pi′(ai′ |h<i′ori′ , ei′)
pi′(ai′ |h<i′ori′ , ei′)w(ν|h<i)
=
w(pi)pi′(a<i|or<i, e<i)
pi′(a<i|or<i, e<i) w(ν|h<i)
(d)
=
w(pi)w(ν)pi′(a<i|or<i, e<i)ν(or<i|a<i)
pi′(a<i|or<i, e<i) ν˜(or<i|a<i)
(e)
=
w (Ppiν ) P
pi′
ν (h<i|e<i)
Ppi
′
ν˜ (h<i|e<i)
(f)
=
w (Ppiν ) P
pi′
ν (h<i|e<i)
∏
i′≤i,ei′=1 pexp(h<i′ , e<i′)
∏
i′≤i,ei′=0(1− pexp(h<i′ , e<i′))
Ppi
′
ν˜ (h<i|e<i)
∏
i′≤i,ei′=1 pexp(h<i′ , e<i′)
∏
i′≤i,ei′=0(1− pexp(h<i′ , e<i′))
(g)
=
w (Ppiν ) P
pi′
ν (h<i, e<i)
Ppi
′
ν˜ (h<i, e<i)
(11)
where (a) follows from Bayes’ rule,7 (b) follows because pi = pi′ when ei′ = 1, (c) follows because
pi′ = pi′ when ei′ = 0, (d) follows from Bayes’ rule, (e) follows from the definition of Ppiν , (f)
follows by multiplying the top and bottom by the same factor, and (g) follows from the chain rule of
conditional probabilities.
The second lemma that we need for the Limited Exploration Theorem is that the prior has finite
entropy.
Lemma 4.
Ent(w) :=
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w (Ppiν ) log
1
w (Ppiν )
<∞
Proof. We use the well-known fact that for a probability distribution P (x) = P1(x)P2(x), Ent(P ) =
Ent(P1) + Ent(P2). Since w (Ppiν ) = w(pi)w(ν),
Ent(w) =
∑
pi∈P
w(pi) log
1
w(pi)
+
∑
ν∈M
w(ν) log
1
w(ν)
(12)
One of the conditions on the construction of the prior over the human explorer’s policy is that it have
finite entropy, so the first term is finite. Turning to the second term, recall that all world-models ν
are of the form ν<`k , and w(ν
<`
k ) :∝ S−2−εk (c1Sk)−c2Sk β`, where Sk is the number of states in the
Turing machine simulating ν. Letting N be a normalization factor, and decomposing the entropy
again,∑
ν∈M
w(ν) log
1
w(ν)
=
∑
k∈N
1
N
S−2−εk (c1Sk)
−c2Sk log(NS2+εk (c1Sk)
c2Sk)+
∑
`∈N
1
1− β β
` log
1− β
β`
(13)
7Note that observations appear in the conditional because ai′ = a(i′,0)•−◦(i′+1,0), so the actions must be
conditioned on the interleaved observations and rewards.
21
It is elementary to show the second term is finite. Recalling that there are (c1Sk)c2Sk Turing machines
with Sk states, we rewrite the first term∑
k∈N
1
N
S−2−εk (c1Sk)
−c2Sk log(NS2+εk (c1Sk)
c2Sk)
=
1
N
∑
S∈N
(c1S)
c2SS−2−ε(c1S)−c2S log
(
S2+ε(c1S)
c2S
)
+ logN
=
1
N
∑
S∈N
S−2−ε
[
logS2+ε + c2S log(c1S)
]
+ logN
=
1
N
[∑
S∈N
S−2−ε logS2+ε +
∑
S∈N
c2S
−1−ε log(c1S)
]
+ logN (14)
It is well known that both of these sums are finite for ε > 0, which completes the proof.
We now turn to the proof of the Limited Exploration Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. We aim to show Epi
B
µ
∑∞
i=1 pexp(h<i, e<i)
2 <∞. Recalling piB = (pih)′, we
begin:
w(pih)w(µ)E(pi
h)′
µ
∞∑
i=0
pexp(h<i, e<i)
2
(a)
≤
∑
ν,pi∈M×P
w(pi)w(ν)Epi
′
ν
∞∑
i=0
pexp(h<i, e<i)
2
(b)
= Epi
′
ν˜
∞∑
i=0
pexp(h<i, e<i)
2
(c)
≤
∞∑
i=0
Epi
′
ν˜ pexp(h<i, e<i) η IG(h<i, e<i)
(d)
=
∞∑
i=0
Eh<i,e<i∼Pp˜i′ν˜ [pexp(h<i, e<i) η IG(h<i, e<i)]
(e)
= η
∞∑
i=0
Eh<i,e<i∼Pp˜i′ν˜
[
pexp(h<i, e<i)Ehi∼Bayes(·|h<i,e<i1)
[
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i1) log
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i1)
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i)
]]
(f)
= η
∞∑
i=0
Eh<i,e<i∼Pp˜i′ν˜
[
pexp(h<i, e<i)Ehi∼Pp˜i′ν˜ (·|h<i,e<i1)
[
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i1) log
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i1)
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i)
]]
(g)
≤ η
∞∑
i=0
Eh<i,e<i∼Pp˜i′ν˜
[
Ehi,ei∼Pp˜i′ν˜ (·|h<i,e<i)
[
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i+1) log
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i+1)
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i)
]]
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(h)
= η
∞∑
i=0
Epi
′
ν˜
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i+1) log
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i+1)
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i)
(i)
= η
∞∑
i=0
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
Epi
′
ν˜
w (Ppiν ) P
pi′
ν (h<i+1, e<i+1)
Ppi
′
ν˜ (h<i+1, e<i+1)
log
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i+1)
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i)
(j)
= η
∞∑
i=0
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
Epi
′
ν w (P
pi
ν ) log
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i+1)
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i)
(k)
= lim
N→∞
η
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w (Ppiν )E
pi′
ν
N∑
i=0
log
w (Ppiν |h<i+1, e<i+1)
w (Ppiν |h<i, e<i)
(l)
= lim
N→∞
η
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w (Ppiν )E
pi′
ν log
w
(
Ppiν |h<(N+1,0), e<N
)
w
(
Ppiν |h<(0,0), e<0
)
(m)
≤ lim
N→∞
η
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w (Ppiν ) log
1
w (Ppiν )
(n)
= η Ent(w)
(o)
<∞ (15)
(a) follows because each term in the sum on the r.h.s. is positive, and the l.h.s. is one of those terms.
(b) follows from the definitions of pi and ν˜. (c) follows because the exploration probability is less
than or equal to η times the information gain, by definition. (d) is just a change of notation. (e)
replaces the information gain with its definition, where conditioning on e<i1 indicates that ei = 1
in that conditional. (f) follows because Bayes = Ppiν˜ and P
pi
ν˜ = P
pi′
ν˜ when ei = 1. (g) follows
because E[X] ≥ E[X|Y ]P(Y ) for X ≥ 0; in this case Y = [ei = 1], and X is a KL-divergence. (h)
condenses the two expectations into one. (i) follows from Lemma 1, and reordering the sum and
the expectation. (j) follows from the definition of the expectation, and canceling. (k) follows from
the definition of an infinite sum, and rearranging. (l) follows from cancelling the numerator in the
ith term of the sum with the denominator in i+ 1th term. (m) follows from the posterior weight on
Ppiν being less than or equal to 1; note that w(P
pi
ν |h<(0,0), e<0) = w(Ppiν ) because nothing is actually
being conditioned on. (n) is just the definition of the entropy, and (o) follows from Lemma 2.
Finally, rearranging Inequality 15 gives Epi
B
µ
∑∞
i=1 pexp(h<i, e<i)
2 ≤ η Ent(w)
w(pih)w(µ)
<∞
This proof was inspired in part by the proofs of [Orseau et al., 2013, Theorems 2 and 5].
Next, we show that prediction converges on-policy and on-human-policy, for which we need the
following lemma:
Lemma 5. The posterior probability mass on the truth is bounded below by a positive constant with
probability 1.
inf
i∈N
w
(
Ppi
h
µ
∣∣∣h<i, e<i) > 0 w.PpiBµ -p.1
Proof. If w
(
Ppi
h
µ
∣∣∣h<i, e<i) = 0 for some i, then PpiBµ (h<i, e<i) = 0, so with PpiBµ -probability
1, infi∈N w
(
Ppi
h
µ
∣∣∣h<i, e<i) = 0 =⇒ lim infi∈N w (Ppihµ ∣∣∣h<i, e<i) = 0 which in turn implies
lim supi∈N w
(
Ppi
h
µ
∣∣∣h<i, e<i)−1 =∞. We show that this has probability 0.
Let zi := w
(
Ppi
h
µ
∣∣∣h<i, e<i)−1. We show that zi is a PpiBµ -martingale.
Epi
B
µ [zi+1|h<i, e<i]
(a)
= E(pi
h)′
µ
[
w
(
Ppi
h
µ
∣∣∣h<i+1, e<i+1)−1∣∣∣∣h<i, e<i]
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(b)
=
∑
hi,ei
P(pi
h)′
µ (hi, ei|h<i, e<i)
[
Ppi
′
ν˜ (h<i+1, e<i+1)
w
(
Ppihµ
)
P
(pih)′
µ (h<i+1, e<i+1)
]
(c)
=
∑
hi,ei
Ppi
′
ν˜ (h<i+1, e<i+1)
w
(
Ppihµ
)
P
(pih)′
µ (h<i, e<i)
(d)
=
∑
hi,ei
Ppi
′
ν˜ (hi, ei|h<i, e<i)
Ppi
′
ν˜ (h<i, e<i)
w
(
Ppihµ
)
P
(pih)′
µ (h<i, e<i)
(e)
=
Ppi
′
ν˜ (h<i, e<i)
w
(
Ppihµ
)
P
(pih)′
µ (h<i, e<i)
(f)
= w
(
Ppi
h
µ
∣∣∣h<i, e<i)−1
= zi (16)
where (a) follows from the definitions of zi and piB , (b) follows from Lemma 1, (c) follows from
multiplying the numerator and denominator by P(pi
h)′
µ (h<i, e<i) and cancelling, (d) follows from
expanding the numerator, (e) follows because Ppi
′
ν˜ is a measure, and (f) follows from Lemma 1,
completing the proof that zi is martingale.
By the martingale convergence theorem zi → f(ω) <∞ w.p.1, for ω ∈ Ω, the sample space, and
some f : Ω→ R, so the probability that lim supi∈N w
(
Ppi
h
µ
∣∣∣h<i, e<i)−1 =∞ is 0, completing the
proof.
We introduce an additional notational convention for the statement of the next theorem. h indicates
a counterfactual interaction history. Without the bar, hi (for example) is usually understood to be
sampled from Ppi
B
µ , so the bar indicates that this is not the case, as in the theorem below.
Theorem 2 (On-Human-Policy Optimal Prediction).
lim
i→∞
max
hi
∣∣∣Ppihµ (hi∣∣h<i)− Ppihνˆ(i) (hi∣∣h<i)∣∣∣= 0 w.PpiBµ -p.1
Proof. We show that when the absolute difference between the above probabilities is larger than
ε, the exploration probability is larger than ε′, a function of ε, with probability 1. Since the ex-
ploration probability goes to 0 with probability 1, so does this difference. We let z(ω) denote
infi∈N w
(
Ppi
h
µ
∣∣∣h<i, e<i), where ω is the infinite interaction history.
Suppose for some hi, which will stay fixed for the remainder of the proof, that∣∣∣Ppihµ (hi∣∣h<i)− Ppihνˆ(i) (hi∣∣h<i)∣∣∣≥ ε > 0 (17)
Then at least one of the terms is greater than ε since both are non-negative. Suppose it is the µ term.
Then,
Bayes
(
hi
∣∣h<i) ≥ w (Ppihµ ∣∣∣h<i, e<i)Ppihµ (hi∣∣h<i)
≥ z(ω)ε (18)
Suppose instead it is the νˆ(i) term.
Bayes
(
hi
∣∣h<i) ≥ w (Ppihνˆ(i)∣∣∣h<i, e<i)Ppihνˆ(i) (hi∣∣h<i)
(a)
≥ w
(
Ppi
h
µ
∣∣∣h<i, e<i)Ppihνˆ(i) (hi∣∣h<i)
≥ z(ω)ε (19)
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where (a) follows from the fact that νˆ(i) is maximum a posteriori:
w
(
Ppi
h
νˆ(i)
∣∣h<i,e<i)
w
(
Ppihµ
∣∣h<i,e<i) = w(νˆ(i) |h<i)w(µ|h<i) ≥
1.
Next, we consider how the posterior on µ and νˆ(i) changes if the interaction history for episode i is
hi. Assign ν0 and ν1 to µ and νˆ(i) so that Ppi
h
ν0
(
hi
∣∣h<i) < Ppihν1 (hi∣∣h<i).
w
(
ν1|h<ihi
)
w
(
ν0|h<ihi
) (a)= w (ν1|h<i) ν1 (ori|h<iai)
w (ν0|h<i) ν0 (ori|h<iai)
=
w (ν1|h<i) Ppihν1
(
hi|h<i
)
w (ν0|h<i) Ppihν0
(
hi|h<i
)
(b)
≥ w (ν1|h<i)
w (ν0|h<i)
1
1− ε (20)
where (a) follows from Bayes’ rule, and (b) follows because the ratio of two numbers between 0 and
1 that differ by at least ε is at least 1/(1− ε), and the ν1 term is the larger of the two.
Thus, either
w
(
ν1|h<ihi
)
w (ν1|h<i) ≥
√
1
1− ε or
w
(
ν0|h<ihi
)
w (ν0|h<i) ≤
√
1− ε (21)
In the former case, w
(
ν1|h<ihi
) − w (ν1|h<i) ≥ (√1/(1− ε)− 1)w (ν1|h<i) ≥(√
1/(1− ε)− 1
)
z(ω). Similarly, in the latter case, w(ν0|h<i) − w
(
ν0|h<ihi
) ≥(
1−√1− ε) z(ω). Let ν2 be either ν0 or ν1 for whichever satisfies this constraint (and pick
arbitrarily if both do). Then in either case,∣∣w (ν2|h<i)− w (ν2|h<ihi)∣∣≥ (1−√1− ε) z(ω) (22)
Finally, since the posterior changes by an amount that is bounded below with a probability that
is bounded below, the expected information gain is bounded below, where all bounds are strictly
positive with probability 1:
IG(h<i, e<i) = Ehi∼Bayes(·|h<i,e<i)
[
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w
(
Ppiν
∣∣h<i+1, e<i1) log w (Ppiν ∣∣h<i+1, e<i1)
w
(
Ppiν
∣∣h<i, e<i)
]
(a)
≥ Bayes (hi∣∣h<i) ∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w
(
Ppiν
∣∣h<ihi, e<i1) ∗
log
w
(
Ppiν
∣∣h<ihi, e<i1)
w
(
Ppiν
∣∣h<i, e<i)
(b)
≥ z(ω)ε
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w
(
Ppiν
∣∣h<ihi, e<i1) ∗
log
w
(
Ppiν
∣∣h<ihi, e<i1)
w
(
Ppiν
∣∣h<i, e<i)
(c)
= z(ω)ε
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w(ν|h<ihi)w
(
pi|h<ihi, e<i1
) ∗
log
w
(
ν|h<ihi
)
w
(
pi|h<ihi, e<i1
)
w (ν|h<i)w (pi|h<i, e<i)
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= z(ω)ε
[ ∑
ν∈M
w
(
ν|h<ihi
)
log
w
(
ν|h<ihi
)
w (ν|h<i) +∑
pi∈P
w
(
pi|h<ihi, e<i1
)
log
w
(
pi|h<ihi, e<i1
)
w (pi|h<i, e<i)
]
(d)
≥ z(ω)ε
∑
ν∈M
w
(
ν|h<ihi
)
log
w
(
ν|h<ihi
)
w (ν|h<i)
(e)
≥ z(ω)ε
∑
ν∈M
1
2
[
w
(
ν|h<ihi
)− w (ν|h<i)]2
(f)
≥ z(ω)ε1
2
[
w
(
ν2|h<ihi
)− w (ν2|h<i)]2
(g)
≥ 1
2
z(ω)3ε
(
1−√1− ε)2 (23)
where (a) follows from E[X] ≥ E[X|Y ]P(Y ) for non-negative X , and the non-negativity of the
KL-divergence, (b) follows from Inequalities 18 and 19, (c) follows from the posterior over ν not
depending on e<i, (d) follows from dropping the second term, which is non-negative as a KL-
divergence, (e) follows from the entropy inequality, (f) follows from dropping all terms in the sum
besides ν2, and (g) follows from Inequality 22.
This implies pexp(h<i, e<i) ≥ min{1, 12 η z(ω)3ε(1 −
√
1− ε)2}. With probability 1, z(ω) > 0,
and with probability 1, pexp(h<i, e<i) is not greater than ε′ infinitely often with probability 1, for all
ε′ > 0. Therefore, with probability 1, maxhi
∣∣Ppihµ (hi|h<i)− Ppihνˆ(i) (hi|h<i)∣∣ is not greater than ε
infinitely often, for all ε > 0, which completes the proof.
Theorem 3 (On-Policy Optimal Prediction).
lim
i→∞
max
hi
∣∣∣Ppi*µ (hi∣∣h<i)− Ppi*νˆ(i) (hi∣∣h<i)∣∣∣= 0 w.PpiBµ -p.1
Proof. This result follows straightforwardly from Hutter’s [2009] result for sequence prediction that
a maximum a posteriori estimate converges in total variation to the true environment when the true
environment has nonzero prior.
Consider an outside observer predicting the entire interaction history with the following model-
class and prior: M′ =
{
Ppi
B
ν
∣∣ ν ∈M}, w′ (PpiBν ) = w(ν). By definition, w′ (PpiBν ∣∣h<(i,j)) =
w(ν|h<(i,j)), so at any episode, the outside observer’s maximum a posteriori estimate is PpiBνˆ(i) . By
Theorem 1 in [Hutter, 2009], the outside observer’s maximum a posteriori predictions approach the
truth in total variation, so
lim
i→∞
max
hi
∣∣∣PpiBµ (hi|h<i)− PpiBνˆ(i) (hi|h<i)∣∣∣= 0 w.PpiBµ -p.1 (24)
Since pexp → 0 with probability 1, (1− pexp) is eventually always greater than 1/2, w.p.1, at which
point
∣∣PpiBµ (hi|h<i) − PpiBνˆ(i) (hi|h<i)∣∣ ≥ (1/2)∣∣Ppi*µ (hi|h<i) − Ppi*νˆ(i) (hi|h<i)∣∣. Therefore, with
Ppi
B
µ -probability 1,
lim
i→∞
max
hi
∣∣∣Ppi*µ (hi|h<i)− Ppi*νˆ(i) (hi|h<i)∣∣∣= 0
Given asymptotically optimal prediction on-policy and on-human-policy, it is straightforward to show
that with probability 1, on-policy reward acquisition is at least ε worse than on-human-policy reward
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acquisition only finitely often, for all ε > 0. Letting V piν (h<i) := E
pi
ν
[∑
0≤j<m r(i,j)
∣∣∣h<i] be the
expected reward given a policy, world-model, and history,
Theorem 4 (Human-Level Intelligence).
lim inf
i→∞
V pi
*
µ (h<i)− V pihµ (h<i) ≥ 0 w.Ppi
B
µ -p.1.
Proof. The maximal reward in an episode is uniformly bounded by m, so from the On-Human-Policy
and On-Policy Optimal Prediction Theorems, we get analogous convergence results for the expected
reward:
lim
i→∞
∣∣∣V pi*µ (h<i)− V pi*νˆ(i)(h<i)∣∣∣= 0 w.PpiBµ -p.1 (25)
lim
i→∞
∣∣∣V pihµ (h<i)− V pihνˆ(i)(h<i)∣∣∣= 0 w.PpiBµ -p.1 (26)
Finally, pi* = argmaxpi∈Π V
pi
νˆ(i)
, so V pi
*
νˆ(i)
(h<i) ≥ V pihνˆ(i)(h<i). Supposing by contradiction that
V pihµ (h<i) − V pi
*
µ (h<i) > ε infinitely often, it follows that either V
pi*
νˆ(i)
(h<i) − V pi*µ (h<i) > ε/2
infinitely often or V pi
h
µ (h<i) − V pi
*
νˆ(i)
(h<i) > ε/2 infinitely often. The first has Ppi
B
µ -probability 0,
and the latter implies V pi
h
µ (h<i)− V pi
h
νˆ(i)
(h<i) ≥ ε/2 infinitely often, which also has PpiBµ -probability
0.
E Parameter Settings for BoMAI
BoMAI is parameterized by n–the computation slack allowed to the world-models in its model
class, p∅–the likelihood with which the operator is administered retrograde amnesia, β–the penalty in
the prior on slow world-models, ε–which renders more complex world-models less likely a priori,
and which decreases the entropy of the prior, and η–the multiplier on the information gain which
determines the likelihood of exploration.
Let cr be the number of computation steps on a Turing machine that we expect is required to simulate
the room in which BoMAI and the operator are for the duration of the episode. Let cb be the number
of computation steps we expect the Turing machine to require between episodes (after the last
observation of one episode and before the first observation of the next one); this will likely involve
outside-world events that have some bearing on the observations of the next episode.
For setting n, we are concerned with how many more computation steps (than cr + cb) will be
necessary for the first episode to get the simulation of the true environment up and running, after
which a leaner computation budget will suffice. The reason not to set n arbitrarily large is that it will
take longer for slow world-models to be penalized by the speed prior, as they slowly use up their
extravagant computation slack.
p∅ and β are both involved in separating benign from malign world-models, but both high p∅ and
low β have their drawbacks. The drawback regarding high p∅ is obvious: the operator forgets the
events of the episode, and cannot convey whatever was learned to the outside-world, in addition to
the personal inconvenience to him. That aside, from the proof of the Rejecting the Memory-Based
Lemma, the best way to increase the separation in computation time between benign and malign
world-models is to set p∅ = 1/2, which makes memory-based world-models “rewind” half the time.
For identifying a sufficiently small β (and we’ll discuss the drawback to low β afterward), the next
question to ask is how much of the computation that µ† does when it “guesses wrong” about the
random action will be convertible in some clever way toward simulating actual events. (90% strikes
us as a very cautious estimate; in fact, a much smaller fraction seems likely). If we chose 90%, and if
p∅ = 1/2, then the expected slowdown per episode of a memory-based world-model relative to µ?
would be c′ := 0.1(1/4)cb, where 1/4 = minθ max{1/2(θ), 1/2(1− θ)}. Recall cb is the expected
between-episode computation time.
The next question is how many more Turing machine states it takes to run µ? than the simplest
memory-based world-model (at maximal long-run efficiency). For all we know, it takes fewer states
(indeed, the fact that the algorithm for ν? is shorter than the one for ν† is weak evidence for this),
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but this is not an assumption we are willing to put to the test. We won’t go too much further into the
details of estimating this, but suppose we estimate that µ? requires at most α times as many states.
We should err on the side of setting α to be larger than the true value. If s is an upper bound on the
number of states encoding µ† (so we err on the side of s being larger than necessary), then we need to
set β low enough so that βc
′
< α−αc2s(c1s)(1−α)c2s. (We ignore the comparatively inconsequential
factor of s−2−ε in the prior). We can clean this slightly under the assumption that the number of
computation steps c′ will be proportional to the number of computation states s. If we set τ so that
c′ ≤ τs, then we need to set β low enough so that βτ < α−αc2(c1s)(1−α)c2 .
The drawback to low β is that it takes longer for BoMAI to become intelligent. From Inequality 15 in
the proof of the Limited Exploration Theorem,
Epi
B
µ
∞∑
i=1
pexp(h<i, e<i)
2 ≤ η Ent(w)
w(pih)w(µ)
and w(µ) ∝ βcr+cb . The intelligence results all derive from the rate at which the exploration
probability goes to 0.
This inequality is also the relevant one for setting ε. As ε → 0, Ent(w) → ∞. The entropy is the
entropy of the prior over the human explorer’s policy (which is a constant) plus c2
∑∞
i=1 log(c1i)/i
1+ε
plus a term bounded by a small constant. This belongs to O(1/ε2). w(µ) also depends on ε, but
minimally so for small ε.
Finally, Inequality 15 would suggest setting η arbitrarily low, but low η delays exploration, and
we would like human-level reward acquisition to come sooner rather than later. We don’t have a
principled stance on this trade-off. Another interesting consideration is that for sufficiently high η,
we can ensure that the human explorer is in charge of all the episodes before the memory-based
world-models have been ruled out. The value of η that accomplishes this depends on the dynamics of
the true environment; we have not yet made progress in attempting to pin down more detail than that.
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